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ABSTRACT
We examine empirically how legal origin, creditor rights, property rights, legal formalism, and
financial development affect the design of price and non-price terms of bank loans in almost 60
countries. Our results support the law and finance view that private contracts reflect differences in
legal protection of creditors and the enforcement of contracts. Loans made to borrowers in countries
where creditors can seize collateral in case of default are more likely to be secured, have longer
maturity, and have lower interest rates. We also find evidence, however, that ?Coasian? bargaining
can partially offset weak legal or institutional arrangements. For example, lenders mitigate risks
associated with weak property rights and government corruption by securing loans with collateral
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I. Introduction 
 
In recent years, a substantial body of empirical evidence has linked laws and institutions to 
the development of financial and economic systems.  Pioneered and developed by La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV hereafter), among other authors, this literature 
documents that the historical origin of a country’s legal system, in particular, countries with 
English common-law origin vs. French civil-law origin, is strongly correlated with financial and 
economic “outcomes”.  For example, countries with English origin (French origin) provide the 
strongest (weakest) legal protections to both shareholders and creditors (LLSV, 1998, 2000a).  
Countries with English origin also seem to have better institutions, including less corrupt 
governments (LLSV, 1999), more efficient courts and bankruptcy procedures (Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, DLLS hereafter, 2003), and more informative accounting 
standards.  These better institutions, in turn, seem to lead to better outcomes for the financial 
system.  Relative to firms in French-origin countries, firms in English-origin countries have more 
dispersed shareholder ownership (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, LLS hereafter, 1999), 
rely more on external capital markets to raise funds (LLSV, 1997), have higher values (LLSV, 
2002), and can enter a new market or industry more easily (DLLS, 2002). 
Despite these connections from legal origin to institutions to financial/economic outcomes, 
less is known about how these three links connect and relate to each other.  In particular, does 
legal origin, through its shaping of a country’s laws and institutions, cause observed differences in 
outcomes?  If so, through what channels?  Related to the LLSV results, there is evidence that legal 
origin does play an important role in explaining differences in financial systems and in economic 
growth.
1  For example, the English common law system is superior to the French civil law system 
                                                            
1 First, there is the finance and growth literature supporting the view that developing financial system stimulates 
economic growth (e.g., McKinnon, 1973; King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998). The second strand of 
literature attempts to establish the link and causality of law, finance, and growth: for example, Levine (1999) provides   3 
in its ability to adapt to evolving economic conditions (e.g., Hayek, 1960; Posner, 1973; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2003b).  As a result, firms in French civil law countries face higher 
obstacles in accessing external finance than those in English common law countries (e.g., Beck et 
al., 2003c).
2 
There are factors, however, that can alter the financial and economic outcomes as predicted 
by LLSV papers.  Perhaps the most important of these factors flows from the Coasian view that, 
with low transactions costs, individuals can privately contract and protect each other’s rights and 
interests irrespective of the law.  According to this logic, “Coasian bargaining” allows agents to 
undo the detrimental effects of a weak legal system.  If some private contract terms substitute for 
legal protections, for example, then links between legal institutions and outcomes ought to be 
partially – or even fully – offset.  It is reasonable to believe that an important aspect of the 
transaction costs in Coasian bargaining is the efficiency of a country’s institutions.
3   
This paper studies how laws and institutions in different countries shape the ownership of 
bank loans as well as the price and non-price terms of these contracts.  We employ a data set of 
loans originated between 1994 to 2003 in about 60 countries, and test how loan terms vary across 
countries in a reduced form setting.  We argue that bank loan contracts depend on country-level 
variables incorporating legal and institutional factors, and on loan-level variables incorporating 
borrower and loan characteristics.  Our main focus is on the effects of country-level factors.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
evidence at country level, Rajan and Zingales (1998) at the industry level, and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998) find firm-level evidence.  Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that financial deregulation in U.S. banking was 
followed by accelerated growth. 
 
2 Other endeavors on understanding institutions include examining the endowment of geography and disease 
environment in former colonial countries (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2002; Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Levine, 2003a), property rights (e.g., Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff, 2002), and religion and cultural 
beliefs (e.g., Greif, 1994; Stulz and Williamson, 2003). 
 
3 In this regard, Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) differentiate laws and institutions governing transactions between the 
government/elites and ordinary citizens (property rights institutions) from those governing the transactions among 
ordinary citizens (contracting institutions).   4 
Specifically, we examine the basic pricing term (the interest rate), two non-price terms (loan 
maturity and the secured status of the loan), along with three ownership variables (the number of 
lenders, the share of each loan held by banks located in the same country as the borrower, and the 
share of each loan held by government-owned banks).  We test how these loan attributes vary with 
differences in creditor rights, property rights, government corruption, the functioning of the courts, 
and financial and economic development.  While other studies have tested how a single dimension 
of the loan contract responds to country-level variables, ours is the first to explore in a 
multivariate setting how ownership and contracts are determined.  This multi-dimensional 
approach allows us to provide a more complete characterization of how the overall availability of 
credit may respond to the contracting environment.
4 
We draw three broad conclusions from our findings.  First, consistent with the law and 
finance view, a country’s laws and institutions are important in shaping private contracts.  We find 
that protection of creditors’ rights in the law is perhaps the most important of these factors.  
Unlike most existing research, we differentiate creditor rights along two different dimensions: 
Creditors’ ability to seize collateral in the case of default versus their ability to oust incumbent 
management during reorganization.  We find that creditors’ ability to take collateral is crucial in 
shaping terms of the loan contracts, while their ability to oust management is not.  For example, as 
creditor’s ability to take collateral increases, bank loans are more likely to be secured by collateral, 
and tend to have longer maturity and lower interest rates.  Our results suggest that a contract term 
that potentially reduces lender risk – collateral – is seen most commonly where it is most easily 
                                                            
4 Giannetti (2003) links private firms’ financing decisions including loans to cross-country institutional variables, 
whereas Esty and Megginson (2003) consider only loan ownership and Esty (2004) considers foreign (loan) 
ownership.  Outside of lending, Jappelli et al. (2002) look at mortgage markets and judicial efficiencies; Bergman and 
Nicolaeivsky (2003) look at corporate charters before and after IPO in Mexico; Kaplan, Martel, and Stromberg (2003) 
and Lerner and Schoar (2004) examine private equity contracts in developed and developing countries; Aggarwal, 
Klapper, and Wysocki (2003) examine the investment allocation choices of actively-managed US mutual funds in 
emerging economies; and Rossi and Volpin (2004) examine cross-country determinants of mergers and acquisitions. 
Finally, Sufi (2004) examines loan ownership in the U.S.   5 
enforceable in the law.  Consistent with this interpretation, once banks secure the loan with 
collateral, firms can borrow at a lower cost, as loan interest rates decline when creditor rights 
strengthen.  How do lenders insure repayment where creditor rights are weak?  First, in addition to 
imposing higher interest rates, lenders ‘put the borrower on a short leash’ by reducing maturity.  
Second, loan ownership is more diffuse in countries with weak creditor rights protection.  
Diffusion of ownership reduces the risk to lenders directly via diversification, but it also may 
preclude borrowers from engaging in strategic default by increasing the ex-post cost of 
restructuring bad loans (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Esty and Megginson, 2003; Diamond, 
2004).  Thus, loan ownership may act as yet another tool for lenders operating in countries where 
their bargaining power is otherwise relatively weak (due to the legal arrangement). 
We also find that greater legal formalism in a borrower’s country, previously shown in 
DLLS (2003) to lead to slower and less efficient courts, significantly alters the terms of loan 
contracts.  First, loans made in countries with greater formalism are more likely to be secured and 
tend to have longer maturity.  Second, legal formalism seems to affect the terms of the contracts 
differently for rated vs. unrated firms.  With greater formalism, a larger fraction of unrated loans 
are owned by domestic banks (banks located in the same country as the borrower), while the 
opposite is true for rated loans.  Moreover, interest rates on loans to rated borrowers rise with 
more formalism, whereas rates are unrelated to formalism for loans to unrated borrowers.  We 
argue that interest rates on loans to unrated borrowers, where local lenders are dominant, do not 
reflect the costs of using the courts (legal formalism) because local lenders usually re-contract or 
workout loans privately.  In contrast, interest rates to rated borrowers increase with the costs of 
using courts because foreign lenders expect to use courts for defaulted loans.  This interpretation is 
consistent with Mian (2004), who finds that foreign lenders in Pakistan are more likely to use 
courts to restructure defaulted loans, compared to domestic banks.  Overall our results are   6 
consistent with the implications from DLLS (2003), who find that more legal formalism raises 
contracting costs. 
Second, our results document the potential importance of ‘Coasian bargaining’ in 
offsetting the costs of a weak institutional or legal framework.  For example, government 
corruption and property rights, while very significant in explaining collateral and maturity, are not 
significantly related to loan interest rates.
5  This suggests that much of the risks associated with 
lending in countries where legal protections are weak and government expropriation risk is high 
may be substantially mitigated through private contracting.  For example, the use of collateral 
decreases as property rights protection improves, whereas loan maturity increases significantly 
when government corruption improves.  Thus, where the risk of government expropriation is high, 
banks seem able to protect themselves with collateral and by putting the borrower on a ‘short 
leash’.  Maturity may act as an especially important tool for banks operating in these environments 
because shortening loan duration mitigates risk even absent a well-functioning legal regime (e.g., 
Diamond, 2004). 
Third, our empirical work illustrates how loan ownership structure interacts with price and 
non-price loan contract terms.  For example, we find that decreased loan concentration (i.e. more 
banks participating in a loan) comes with a greater likelihood that collateral is used.  Diffuse loan 
ownership – which again may reduce strategic defaults – may therefore complement collateral as a 
mechanism to solve borrower control problems.  As noted above, we find that the share of loans 
owned by domestic banks increases with legal formalism due to their ability to restructure loans 
                                                            
5 Using similar data sets like ours, Bae and Ghoyal (2004) link loan interest rates (only) to cross country legal and 
institutional variables.  They find no effect of creditor rights (combining ability to take collateral and oust 
management) on loan rates, similar to our results.  They do not, however, split the creditor rights variable into two 
components, as we do.  Also, they do find a negative relationship between property rights and interest rates on loans, 
based on loans made to Asian countries, in which interest rates on loans are not based on a markup over LIBOR rates 
as loans from other regions are priced.  We drop Asian loans in our interest rate regressions because the rates are not 
comparable to the spreads from other regions in Dealscan.   7 
privately.  In addition, interest rates decline with the participation of domestic banks, perhaps 
suggesting their better ability to assess borrower risk and perhaps solve control problems than 
foreign banks.  Esty (2004) finds similar results with a sample of project finance loans. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review related strands of 
literature on the forces that shape bank loan contracts across different borrower countries, and we 
describe our key legal and institutional variables.  In Section III, we describe our sample of bank 
loans around the globe, and then present the main empirical results.  Section IV concludes the 
paper.  The Appendix contains explanations of all the variables that we use in the paper. 
II. Financial Contracts, Legal Protection, and Institutions 
  In this section we briefly review related strands of literature on law, finance, institutions, 
and financial contracting between business counterparties.  We then use these theoretical 
arguments to motivate our empirical model. 
  Our point of departure is the now well-established set of links between legal and 
institutional variables and financial-system “outcomes” measured at the country level.  LLSV 
(1997, 1998) differentiate countries with legal systems derived from those in England, France, 
Germany and Scandinavia.  In addition to these four legal origins, LLSV also characterize another 
group of countries as having “socialist origin” – the countries that have evolved from socialist, 
centrally planned economies to market-based economies.  LLSV find that countries with English 
common-law and French civil-law origins are at the extremes.  For example, relative to the French 
legal-origin countries, the English common-law countries have larger financial systems as a share 
of GDP, they have bigger securities markets, more IPOs, more diffuse ownership of public equity, 
higher Tobin’s Q, and higher dividend payouts that are more closely tied to profits.  In addition, 
the English group of countries offers stronger legal protection of shareholders and creditors, and 
they have more efficient courts and judicial systems.  Not surprisingly, countries with socialist   8 
origin are much closer to French-origin countries than to English-origin countries in terms of their 
legal and financial systems. 
  Before describing our approach in detail, it is worth briefly describing the “Coasian view” 
(Coase, 1937, 1960) that private parties, absent significant transaction costs, can reach an optimal 
contract – or move toward an optimal contract – even when certain aspects of the contract are not 
specified in the law.  At first blush, the strong link between a country’s laws/institutions and the 
fitness of its financial system undercuts, to some degree, the Coasian logic.  That is, if transactions 
costs were low enough and all contracts enforceable, then all positive NPV investments would be 
financed – no financial system would have “better” outcomes than any other.  The Coasian logic 
dictates that financial counterparties living in systems with “weak” institutions will find clever 
ways to offset, or partially offset, the limitation and weakness of those institutions.  Applied to the 
case of bank loan contracts, for example, lenders might seek extra protection beyond what is 
provided by the legal system through bargaining.  The final contract might include protection 
clauses not provided by law upon agreement from both the lender and borrower, so long as the 
costs of writing and enforcing these clauses are lower than the benefits of adding them.  Even if 
the ‘Coase Theorem’ held exactly, we might still be able to observe differences in the terms of 
contracts.  Thus, our empirical strategy will help illustrate how financial counterparties attempt to 
offset the costs of contracting in a country with weak laws/institutions.  
Despite the work of LLSV and others, we still know very little about how, exactly, these 
legal and institutional variables affect specific aspects of the financial contracts themselves (as 
opposed to outcomes like the size of equity or debt markets relative to GDP).  Our aim is thus to 
test directly how differences in the contracting environment affect the specific terms of bank loans 
to large corporate borrowers.   9 
We consider two sets of explanatory variables that will affect the design of bank loans.  
The first set of variables incorporate micro-level aspects of the loan, the borrower, and the lender.  
These measures have been employed widely in the bank loan literature and, for our purposes, 
should be thought of as control variables.  For example, larger borrowers and borrowers with 
highly rated debt pay lower interest rates and are more likely to be able to borrow on an unsecured 
basis relative to smaller and less well-rated borrowers (Strahan, 1999). 
The second set of variables describes the country-level factors.  These include: (1) 
variables capturing basic legal protections (creditor rights, property rights, and the risk of 
government corruption); (2) the functioning of the courts (legal formalism); (3) legal origin; and 
(4) development (both financial and economic).
6  These country-level differences are the focus of 
the paper.  Taken together they measure how well a country enforces contracts and protects 
investors in practice.  While creditor and property rights specify the basic legal protections, the 
efficiency of the courts can be thought of as a proxy for the transaction costs in the 
implementation of these legal protections, in that the actual protection of creditors can be weak in 
a country despite comprehensive protections provided by law due to the costly implementation 
process. 
  In the remainder of this section, we describe the variables and briefly review why each 
may affect the design of bank loans.  It is reasonable to assume that certain aspects of law and 
institutions will have first-order impact, while others will probably be less important.  We examine 
those aspects of the legal system and a country’s institutions that we view as potentially being 
most important.  For other aspects of the law, whose impact we cannot measure directly, we 
include the legal-origin dummy variables, as in LLSV. 
                                                            
6 Country-level factors also include measures on a country’s macro-economic condition, including business cycles, 
but this is not the focus of our paper.   10 
Creditor Rights 
Creditor rights are of paramount importance for lenders in determining their basic legal 
protections against borrower expropriation.  We start with a single index to measure a borrower 
country’s overall creditor rights.  The index, developed in LLSV’s “Law and Finance” (1998) 
paper, begins at zero and adds one for each of the following conditions that hold: (1) secured 
creditors gain possession of assets once the petition for reorganization receives approval (i.e. there 
is no automatic stay on creditors’ ability to seize collateral); (2) secured creditors are ranked first 
in the distribution of proceeds; (3) there are restrictions such as creditors’ consent for going into 
reorganization; and, (4) management does not stay in control of the firm during the reorganization.   
A higher score indicates stronger creditor rights.  This index is available for about 100 countries 
from the World Bank.   
We use these conditions to develop two additional indices.  The first focuses on conditions 
(1) and (2), which specify ways that managers can prevent secured lenders from getting paid in 
full when the firm is in financial distress.  Thus, a higher score (from 0 to 2) indicates stronger 
creditors’ ability to seize collateral under default/distress scenario.  Clearly the utility of collateral, 
both as a control mechanism and as a tool to reduce loss given default, increases with the index by 
making it easier for lenders to take (or threaten to take) control of assets.
7  Thus, we would expect 
stronger creditor rights to be associated both with greater use of collateral (a cost to borrowers) but 
lower interest rates (a benefit).  The second index keys on the last two categories of the index 
above, indicating what the borrower firm’s managers can do to remain in control of the firm’s 
                                                            
7 Our results linking the law of the borrower’s country to loan terms will, if anything, understate the true impact of 
law for most small and domestic borrowers.  Most of our data are syndicated loans, which is a market dominated by 
large multinational banks serving large borrowers.  Many of these loans are arranged and negotiated in either London 
or New York, and the loan contracts often include a “choice of law” clause that allows the law of the U.S. or U.K. to 
supercede the laws in the borrower’s country.   However, local insolvency laws often override these clauses in the 
event of default (Esty and Megginson, 2002; Norton, 1997).  Thus, to the extent that attempts to export U.S. or U.K. 
law succeed in non-default states, our results will tend to be attenuated. 
   11 
assets despite poor firm performance.  With a higher score (0 to 2), creditors have stronger ability 
to oust management during reorganization following poor performance.
8  Because we need the 
disaggregated information on bankruptcy law to compute these two sub-indices, we lose a 
significant number of countries.  Hence, we report our results first using the broad creditor rights 
index, and then using the two sub-indices. 
Property Rights 
While creditor rights specify lenders’ ability to control defaulting borrowers, our property 
rights measure examines more broadly the extent to which the government and law protect private 
property generally.  The property rights measure is an index ranging from 0 to 5, with a higher 
score indicating better protection of private properties, from the Index of Economic Freedom 
(IEF), published by the Heritage Foundation.  The index measures the degree to which private 
property rights are protected and accounts for the possibility that such property will be 
expropriated.  In addition, it analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of 
corruption within the judiciary, and the ability if individuals and businesses to enforce contracts.
9  
Government Corruption 
To measure government corruption, we follow LLSV (1998, 1999) and use data from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG hereafter).
10  This measure, similar to the property rights 
                                                            
8 It is also important to point out that the creditor rights index is constructed based on whether the protection of 
creditors’ rights (along one of the four dimensions) is provided by the borrower country’s law.  All the other country-
level variables (property rights, corruption, and legal formalism) are constructed based on surveys, and thus may 
contain more measurement error. 
 
9 For a list of variables considered for the index, see Appendix A.1. In compiling the index, the authors of IEF utilize 
sources from Economist Intelligence Unit, ILT Report, 1999; U.S. Department of Commerce, National Trade Data 
Bank of the U.S. and Country Commercial Guides; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1998; and World Bank, Country Briefs, 1998.    
 
10 The ICRG (of the PRS Group, Inc.) rating for each of the more than 120 countries comprises 22 variables in 3 
categories of country risk, political (including corruption), financial, and economic, based on which a composite 
country risk measure is constructed. Details are available at http://www.icrgonline.com/.    12 
measure, is part of ICRG’s “political risk” composite index.  The variable ranges from 0 to 10, 
with lower scores indicating that “high government officials are likely to demand special 
payments and illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government.” 
Unlike ICRG’s financial and economic indices, which are based on mostly statistical models and 
data, the corruption index (as well as other political risk measures) is assessed based on ICRG 
staff’s subjective analysis of “qualitative” political information. 
Both the property rights and the corruption indices measure the risk of expropriation from 
the government or powerful elites of a country.  In contrast, the other variables in our model, such 
as the creditor rights index and the institutional variables described below, measure the risk of 
expropriation from individuals or firms, which are typically the counterparty to the contract.  With 
country-level evidence, Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) argue that expropriation by government 
and elites hinders financial system development and overall economic growth because individuals 
cannot contract around this type of risk.  In particular, standard tools used to offset credit risk, such 
as collateral in a bank loan contract, may be less effective in mitigating the risk of expropriation 
from government or elites.  In contrast, shortening the maturity of the contract may be a more 
robust tool to handle such risk.  By comparing the impact of government corruption with the 
impact of the other law and institution variables on bank loan contracts, we can draw inference on 
the relative importance of these two kinds of risks.  
Legal Formalism 
Legal formalism measures how efficiently the courts of the borrower’s country enforce 
contracts (DLLS, 2003).  Court efficiency matters because lenders’ ability to enforce or threaten to 
enforce specific aspects of a loan contract (e.g. covenants) or take away collateral will depend on 
the costs of using the legal system.  Court efficiency may also matter more broadly for the   13 
borrower as an indicator of how costly it is to enforce contracts beyond the loan agreement (e.g. 
contracts with suppliers, workers, etc.)  Based on extensive surveys of Lex Mundi/Lex Africa 
association of law firms, DLLS have constructed measures based on how courts handle two types 
of cases: Collection of a bounced check, and eviction of a (non-paying) tenant, with a higher score 
in either category implying that the court system is slower (with more bureaucracy) and less 
efficient.
11  These measures are highly positively correlated across countries, and we choose to use 
the check-based formalism index for our study as the process of collecting a check through a court 
is more closely related to creditors’ desire of collecting their investment back from the borrowers 
(although other contracts matter to the borrower too).   
With more legal formalism (i.e. a higher score on the index) in a borrower country, it takes 
longer for lenders to collect money or assets from a borrower.  In anticipation of this, lenders may 
shorten the length of the loan and “put the borrower on a short leash.” Alternatively, with more 
efficient courts, it becomes easier (and quicker) for lenders to seize control of the firm’s assets 
from the firm’s managers when they are allowed to do so.  Thus more efficient courts can actually 
lower borrowers’ bargaining power when negotiating with the lenders.  
Residual Impact of Legal Origin and Financial Development 
  As discussed above, there are potentially other aspects of legal protection and institutional 
efficiency that we do not consider but can affect the design of loans.  Since LLSV have 
demonstrated that almost all of these variables are highly correlated with indicators of legal origin, 
we include these legal origin indicators to proxy for possible omitted variables.  We also control 
                                                            
11 DLLS sent questionnaires to law firms around the globe, which cover the step-by-step evolution of an eviction and 
a check collection before local courts in 115 countries’ largest cities. The questions are divided into two parts: 1) 
description of the procedure of the hypothetical case, including estimates of the actual duration at each stage, whether 
written submissions are required, specific laws applicable, the form of appeal, the existence of alternative 
administrative procedures; 2) multiple choice questions are used to collect additional information. See Appendix A.2 
for the seven categories of legal formalism.  
   14 
for economic and financial development in most of our empirical models.  Financial development 
equals the ratio of total private domestic bank credit to GDP, averaged over the 1994 to 1997 
period;
12 economic development equals the log of GDP per capita, averaged over the 1994 to 2002 
period.   
III. Empirical Methods & Results 
III.1 Data 
  We build a sample of bank loans made to large borrowers located in almost 60 countries 
(excluding the U.S.).  Loan information comes from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan 
database, which provides detailed coverage of bank lending to large corporations.  The dataset 
dates back to the late 1980s, but coverage of lending to companies outside the U.S. was quite 
sparse until the middle of the 1990s.  Hence, we begin our sample with loans originated in 1994 
and include loans originated through the middle of 2003. 
Dealscan allows us to identify which banks are lending to which firms in each year, and to 
observe in detail various terms of the loans at origination, including the interest rate (measured as 
a basis point spread over LIBOR, inclusive of all fees), whether or not the loan is secured, the 
maturity of the loan, the number of lenders involved (many of the loans are syndicated), as well as 
the identity of the borrower and lender.  From these last two pieces of information, we construct 
the share of the loan held (at origination) by banks located in the same country as the borrower, 
and the share held by banks controlled by governments (although not necessarily the borrower’s 
government).
13  These ownership and contract features serve as the basis for the dependent 
                                                            
12 We obtain times series data for all countries from Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2002), which does not provide data 
on financial development after 1997. 
 
13 Information is based on the Bankscope database. Banks are considered government controlled if more than 25% of 
the shares are owned by governments.  The home country of a bank is based on the location of the bank holding 
company.  For example, Citibank’s affiliate operating in India is classified as a U.S. bank.   15 
variables in our models.  The qualitative variable is coded as follows: The secured lending 
indicator equals one if the loan is secured and zero if it is not.  For this model, we estimate a Probit 
and report marginal effects (rather than Probit coefficients).  Thus, the reported coefficients 
represent the change in the probability per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables.  (For 
indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving 
the indicator from 0 to 1.)  The other models are estimated with OLS, where the dependent 
variable equals the log of the number of lenders, the percent of the loan held by government banks 
(ranging from 0 to 100), the percent held by domestic banks (0 to 100), the log of the loan 
maturity (in months), and the log of the basis point spread of the loan interest rate over LIBOR. 
Beyond these loan contract terms, Dealscan also includes information on the type of loan 
(e.g. lines of credit versus term loans), the purpose of the loan (e.g. debt repayment, commercial 
paper backup line of credit, general corporate purpose, etc), and the size of the loan.
14  We control 
in our model for loan type and loan purpose with indicator variables, and we control for loan size 
by including the log of the commitment amount (in U.S. dollars).
15  We also include an indicator 
variable equal to one for loans denominated in one of the following major currencies: U.S. dollars, 
Euros, German DM, British pounds, or Japanese Yen. 
 For  borrower  characteristics,  Dealscan contains information on Moody’s and S&P senior 
debt rating at the close of the loan, which we include to control for borrower risk.  We use the 
Moody’s rating unless it is missing, in which case we use S&P, while unrated firms constitute the 
omitted category.  We include an indicator for multinational firms, and a set of 1-digit SIC 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
14 The Dealscan data allow us to observe the commitment amount at origination, but not the amount of funds actually 
taken down by the borrower. 
 
15 Any effects of inflation are absorbed by year fixed effects. 
   16 
indicator variables.
16  We also drop loans to firms in SIC 4 (utilities), 6 (financials) and 9 (public 
sector) because firms in these sectors are more apt to be government owned or government 
protected monopolies; hence, the risks of these kinds of firms may be very different from 
manufacturing and trade firms.  Dealscan has only very sparse information on borrower sales, but 
by including the size of the loan in the models we are able to absorb the bulk of differences based 
on borrower size.  
  Given the selection of banks and firms in Dealscan databases, we acknowledge that the 
results will reflect the effects of cross-country differences in law and institutions on financial 
contracting between large banks and large borrowers.  To some extent focusing on these data 
limits the generality of our findings, but we think that loans to smaller borrowers are likely to be 
shaped significantly by a set of social, cultural and relationship variables that would be difficult or 
impossible to observe and control across a large number of countries (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).  
In our view, individual country-level studies, rather than cross-country comparisons, would offer a 
more fruitful way to understand financial contracting for small firms.
17 
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the loan terms by the legal origin of the borrower 
country.  The loans are of similar size on average in the five country groups, ranging from $133 to 
$224 million.  Pricing appears similar in the English, French, German and Scandinavian legal-
origin countries, with a mean spread over LIBOR ranging from 164 to 180 basis points.  In 
contrast, loan spreads are considerably higher in the formerly Socialist countries (230 bps).  These 
large pricing differences likely reflect, at least in part, the differences in average borrower risk for 
this latter group.  For the non-price contract terms, the share of loans that are secured ranges from 
                                                            
16 A company is defined to be multinational if its parent and the company itself operate in different countries. 
 
17 For example, Allen, Qian, and Qian (2004) show that the private sector in China, despite poor legal protections and 
inadequate financing through standard channels, has been growing very fast, relying on alternative governance 
mechanisms and financing channels such as reputation and relationships.   17 
a low of 27 percent (in the German countries) to a high of 75 percent (in the Scandinavian 
countries).  Note that this variable is missing for about 1/2 of our sample.  Average maturity 
ranges from 50 to 72 months across the groups. 
Ownership also varies considerably across country groups.  For example, government 
ownership of our sample of loans is highest in the formerly Socialist countries (22 percent) and the 
Scandinavian countries (12 percent).  The percentage of loans held by domestic banks is by far the 
lowest in the Socialist countries, presumably because of the relatively low level of financial 
development in these countries.  In contrast, in the German legal-origin countries, domestic bank 
ownership of loans predominates (71 percent). 
III.2 Regression Models 
  In our regression models, we begin by testing in reduced form the effects of country-level 
variables on ownership of loans and the price and non-price terms of these loans.  We then 
consider how the ownership variables interact with the contract terms in our last set of results.  
These latter regressions cannot be viewed as pure reduced forms because the ownership and 
contract terms may be determined jointly.  Thus, it is difficult to determine the causal links 
between the two.  Nevertheless, we think these results help illustrate the extent to which 
ownership affects banks’ ability to enforce loan contract terms.  Last, we report all of our models 
separately for rated and unrated borrowers. 
We control for borrower characteristics with six ratings indicators (AAA, AA, A, BBB, 
BB, and B or worse) and six one-digit SIC industry indicators; we also control for loan 
characteristics with a full set of loan purpose indicators, log of loan size, and an indicator for lines 
of credit.  We also include indicators for legal origin, with the English legal-origin countries 
serving as the omitted category.  To control for business cycle conditions, the models include year 
fixed effects and the growth rate in GDP (in $s) during the year in which the loan was originated.    18 
To control for the level of economic and financial development, we include the log of per-capita 
income in the country and the ratio of private bank credit to GDP.  And, we include the variables 
testing how specific aspects of the financial contracting environment affect ownership and loan 
terms, as described in Section II above.  
Table 2 reports mean values for the country-level variables across the five legal-origin 
groupings.  Consistent with the earlier research of LLSV, countries with French or Socialist legal 
origins tend to have weak protection of creditor & property rights, and their courts tend to have a 
high degree of legal formalism.  In addition, government corruption seems higher in these 
countries relative to the German or Scandinavian legal-origin countries.  Because we have many 
loans for each country (compare the number of observations in Tables 1 and 2), but no variation 
on our key explanatory variables within countries, we cluster the error across all loans made in a 
single country to account for possible dependence in the error.
18 
  Tables 4-6 report the main regression results, while Tables 7-9 then reproduce these results 
after separating the data based on whether or not the borrower has a credit rating.  Table 4 focuses 
on reduced form models of ownership, and Table 5 on reduced form models of the price and non-
price terms of loans.  In Table 6, we introduce the ownership variables as right-hand side variables 
in the regressions for loan terms. 
III.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Before describing these results, it is worth acknowledging the potential problem of 
unobserved firm-level heterogeneity.  As noted, we do attempt to control for borrower attributes 
by including loan size, ratings indicators, and industry indicators in our regressions; but lenders 
clearly have access to more information than that, and they may use their additional information to 
                                                            
18 For example, measurement error in a county-level legal or institutional variable would induce correlation in the 
model error across all loans to borrowers living in that country.   19 
set loan terms.  Therefore, there is the possibility that omitted firm-level characteristics may bias 
our results.   
We deal with this problem in two ways.  First, we have obtained a sample of borrower-
level observable characteristics by manually matching Dealscan loan data with annual reports 
from the Worldscope database.  In Table 3, we report the correlation between firm size (log of 
market capitalization), profits (net income divided by book value of assets) and leverage (total 
debt to assets) and our legal and institutional variables for this sub-sample.  These correlations are 
very low and not statistically significant, with the exception that the log of (firm) market value is 
positively correlated with the corruption index (ρ = 0.33).  Consequently, other than corruption 
there seems to be little room for omitted firm attributes to bias our coefficients of interest. 
As a second test, we report our results in Tables 4-6 with and without those firm-level 
variables that we can observe.  This second approach is especially important given that firm size 
and corruption are found to be correlated.  If omitting observable dimensions of firm risk (which 
includes firm size as proxied by loan size) does not change the coefficients of interest, it seems 
implausible to us that omitting unobservable dimensions will create an important source of bias.  
As it turns out, our results are robust to the exclusion of these control variables. 
III.4 Results 
Ownership 
The concentration of ownership of bank loans seems to be higher – that is, the number of 
lenders is lower – in countries that are better developed economically (Table 4, columns 1 and 2).  
Moreover, as found in Ongena and Smith (2000), better protection of creditor rights is associated 
with fewer lenders (marginally significant).  These results suggest that diversification – spreading 
a syndicated loan across many lenders – is one of the tools that banks can use to mitigate legal,   20 
institutional and other non-business risks.  We also find, as do Ongena and Smith (2000) and Esty 
and Megginson (2003), that ownership concentration is significantly lower in the civil law 
countries (French and German legal origin), controlling for the observable legal and institutional 
variables.  Esty and Megginson argue that lenders attempt to forestall strategic default in countries 
where creditor rights are weak through diffuse ownership, which could also explain our findings.
19  
While there may be validity to this argument, better protection of property rights and lower levels 
of government corruption seem to come with more, rather than fewer, lenders.  These dimensions 
of country risk may be better dealt with by concentrating the loan amongst banks that understand 
political or government expropriation risk, rather than through diversification. 
The share of loans held by government banks is lower in better-developed economies, and, 
controlling for observables, is much higher in the formerly Socialist countries and Scandinavian 
countries (Table 4, columns 3 and 4).  We conversely find that the share of loans held by domestic 
banks is much lower in the Socialist and Scandinavian countries (columns 5 and 6).  For financial 
development, we find a much higher share of loans held by domestic banks, although this finding 
is true almost by definition because our measure of financial development is based on the size of 
the domestic banking system (relative to GDP). 
We also find that legal formalism is associated with much greater holdings of loans by 
domestic banks.  The effect is large economically as well as statistically.  For example, a standard 
deviation increase in legal formalism (an increase of 1.1) comes with an increase in the share held 
by domestic banks of about 10 percent of the loan.  Mian (2004) shows that foreign lenders are 
more likely than domestic lenders to resolve defaulted loans in a formal court procedure.  He 
argues that foreign lenders are less able to establish long-term relationship capital with borrowers 
                                                            
19 See Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Diamond (2004) for theories explaining why diffusion of ownership can 
reduce the possibility of strategic default, and Sufi (2004) for empirical evidence on U.S. firms and banks. 
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and exploit this relationship during private workouts, thus they resort to formal legal procedures.  
If the cost of using courts increases with legal formalism (as argued by DLLS), then our results 
would support Mian’s conclusions, as foreign lenders will be less willing to lend where court 
procedures are slow and cumbersome.
20 
Contract Terms 
  Table 5 reports reduced form results for the loan contract terms.  As noted, we use two 
specifications for the creditor rights index.  The index in Panel A of Table 5 includes all four 
conditions of creditor protection described in Section II, and ranges from 0 to 4.  In Panel B the 
overall creditor index is split into two: The first (ranging from 0 to 2) indicates creditors’ ability to 
oust management during reorganization, while the second (also ranging from 0 to 2) indicates their 
ability to seize collateral under a default/distress scenario (i.e. secured creditors gain possession of 
assets once the petition for reorganization receives approval, and secured creditors are ranked first 
in the distribution of proceeds).
21 
We first find that collateral is significantly more common in countries with stronger 
creditor rights (columns 1 and 2 of Panel A).  From Panel B (columns 1 and 2), we see that this 
result is driven by creditors’ rights to seize collateral, while their ability to oust management does 
not have much impact on any of the three contract terms.  Our result thus reflects a kind of 
‘Coasian’ bargaining whereby a contracting tool (collateral) is used more where courts are more 
willing to enforce its terms.  This effect is large economically as well as statistically.  For example, 
the coefficient in Panel B suggests that a borrower in Mexico (index on creditors’ rights to seize 
                                                            
20 We also show in Table 4 that in countries where financial markets are better developed, the domestic ownership 
share is higher.  This result, however, is difficult to interpret because of an obvious and mechanical reverse causality.  
We include it for consistency with the other results, but the other coefficients in the model are not sensitive to the 
exclusion of this variable. 
 
21 The sample size is smaller in Panel B than that in Panel A, because the split creditor rights indexes are available for 
only 49 countries from the LLSV (1998) paper.   22 
collateral = 0) would be 25 percent less likely to post collateral compared to a similar borrower in 
the U.K. (index on creditors’ rights to seize collateral = 2).  The same Coasian bargaining 
argument can also explain the positive relation between economic and financial development and 
secured lending (positive and significant in Panel A; still positive but not significant in Panel B).  
In developed countries, lenders have access to liquid financial markets to sell collateral if 
necessary, making secured lending a more effective contracting tool.  
We also find greater use of collateral in countries with more legal formalism, and where 
there is a higher risk of government expropriation (i.e. weak property rights), although these 
results are again weaker in Panel B.  The coefficient on property rights protection in Panel A 
implies that a standard deviation increase in property rights protection comes with about a 15 
percentage-point decline in the probability that a loan is secured.   
  The maturity of banks loans also appears to be shaped by the contracting environment 
(Table 5, columns 3 and 4 in Panels A and B).  We find that stronger creditor rights, in particular 
creditors’ ability to seize collateral, are associated with longer term lending, and the coefficient is 
again large economically.  From Panel B and using the example from above, the coefficient on 
creditors’ ability to take collateral suggests that loan maturity would be about 25 percent longer in 
the U.K. compared to Mexico.  We also find that increased risk of corruption or expropriation of 
property by governments is associated with shorter term lending. 
Somewhat to our surprise, we find a positive link from legal formalism to loan maturity.  
One potential explanation may be that legal formalism acts as a broader measure of contracting 
costs beyond just the ex-post enforcement costs associated with adjudicating a dispute in the 
courts.  Thus, writing longer-term contracts (increasing loan maturity) may help minimize costs by 
reducing the likelihood of rewriting contracts and enforcing them through courts.  The greater use   23 
of collateral in countries where legal formalism is high may be the means by which lenders protect 
themselves against the greater risk of lending long term.
22 
In the last two columns of Table 5, we test how the pricing of loans reflects the country-
level legal and institutional variables.
23  We find almost no impact of any of the legal or 
institutional variables on the loan interest rate except for creditors’ rights/ability to seize collateral.  
This suggests that the contracting tools emphasized above – ownership, collateral and maturity – 
seem to be affected more by the contracting environment than the price.  This non-result, we 
argue, is quite striking given the strong links found with non-price terms of loans.  Recall that 
where government risk is high, banks loans tend to be secured and they tend to have shorter 
maturity.  The fact that we find no effect of government risk on loan prices suggests that these 
non-price contracting tools allow banks to control this risk effectively.  This does not mean that 
borrowers face no costs of operating where government expropriation is more likely, because 
collateral is costly for them.  However, it reflects a kind of “Coasian” effect whereby contracting 
can help offset, if not fully remove, some of the impediments to investment from poor institutions.   
While institutional variables do not affect interest rates, creditors’ ability to take collateral 
in default does have a significant impact on the cost of capital.  From Table 5 Panel B, and using 
the same example one more time, interest rate spreads on loans are about 38% higher in Mexico 
compared to the U.K.  Taken with our earlier results, we can now describe how creditor rights 
regarding their ability to take collateral shape loan contracts, a central result of our paper:  With 
strong rights, creditors concentrate their holdings, are more apt to use collateral, lend on a long-
                                                            
22 The results on loan maturity are robust when we re-run the regressions by 1-digit SIC of borrowers.  For example, 
creditor rights and legal formalism both enter positively and significant in six out of seven segments (negative but 
insignificant for 1 segment). 
 
23 Since most of the loans in the sample are float-rate loans and the interest rates are measured by the mark-up over 
LIBOR, term-structure factors should not affect our results. As mentioned above, since interest rates on loans made to 
Asian countries are structured differently, we drop Asian loans in our interest rate regressions.   24 
term basis, and charge lower rates.  How do lenders cope with weak legal protection, where 
collateral is less useful to control borrowers?  Our results suggest that loan ownership 
concentration is reduced (thus reducing the strategic default problem and facilitating 
diversification of risk across lenders), maturity is shortened (thus effectively putting borrowers on 
a short leash), and interest rate is higher (thus pricing for the possible losses in default).
24  Finally, 
from Panel B we can see that the other dimension of the creditor rights, i.e., their ability to oust 
management, does not seem to affect any of the loan contract terms.  The difference between the 
two dimensions of creditor rights may stem from the fact that in our sample of syndicated loans, 
foreign banks, which play leading roles in the syndicate, should be much more concerned about 
whether they can take and sell loan collateral than oust an incompetent manager in countries with 
very different institutional and economic background from their own.  
In Table 6, we add the ownership terms as right-hand-side variables in the loan contract 
regressions.  Adding loan ownership has little effect on the links from the legal and institutional 
variables to the loan terms.  However, ownership itself is significantly correlated with collateral 
and pricing of loans.  For example, loan concentration is strongly associated with collateral, 
whereas the participation of domestic banks is strongly related to pricing.  Loans with a greater 
number of participating banks are more likely to be secured.  A one standard deviation increase in 
the number of participating banks increases the probability that a loan is secured by about 7 
percentage points.  This suggests a complementarity between two control mechanisms: collateral 
(to raise the direct cost associated with default to borrowers) along with diffuse ownership (to 
raise the deadweight costs associated with default, thus preventing strategic default). 
                                                            
24 There are additional tools for lenders to overcome poor protection of creditor rights.  For example, Siegel (2004) 
shows that Mexican firms that cross list in New York (voluntarily) follow U.S. securities laws and protect investors 
beyond what is required in Mexico.  Jappelli and Pagano (2002) examine private credit bureaus and public credit 
registers and find that better information sharing leads to more bank lending and lower defaults.    25 
Participation in a loan by domestic banks is also very strongly correlated with the loan 
interest rate.
25  A standard deviation increase in this percentage (41 percentage points) comes with 
an eight to 12 percent reduction in the loan interest rate (the all-in spread).  This decline suggests 
that domestic banks have an advantage relative to foreign banks in overcoming information and 
control problems.  With asymmetric information, uninformed foreign banks may require higher 
loan interest rates when relatively well-informed domestic banks are unwilling to fund a 
significant portion of the deal.
26  According to this adverse selection explanation, most opaque 
borrowers will be served by domestic banks to avoid paying this ‘lemons’ discount.  And, there is 
some evidence for this allocation of borrowers to banks in our results.  For example, the models in 
Table 4, where we explain domestic bank ownership share with country and borrower 
characteristics, suggest that rated firms (i.e. transparent firms) are more likely to be served by 
foreign banks.  The share of loans held by local banks is 11 percentage points lower for B-rated 
firms relative to unrated firms (coefficients not reported in Table 4).
27  Mian (2004) finds similar 




                                                            
25 We also find a negative relation between shares held by government banks and interest rates, although this result is 
not statistically significant.  LLS (2002) find that government ownership of banks slows down economic growth, 
while Sapienza (2004) finds that state-owned banks in Italy charge lower interest rates to firms with political 
connections with the banks.   
 
26 However, since we only observe contract terms at the loan closing date, we cannot compare the subsequent  
performance of the loans.  La Porta et al. (2003) examine related lending in Mexico (banks lend to firms controlled by 
banks’ owners) and find that related loans have lower interest rates, are less likely to post collateral, more likely to 
default and have lower recovery rates, compared to unrelated ones.   
 
27 In fact, relative to unrated firms, the percentage held by domestic banks is 13 points lower for AAA rated firms, 3 
points lower for AA rated firms, 8 points lower for A rated firms, 13 points lower for BBB rated firms, 14 points 
lower for BB rated firms, and 11 points lower for firms with B rating or below. 
   26 
Rated v. Unrated Borrowers  
  Tables 7 through 9 report the same set of regressions for rated and unrated borrowers.
28  
These results suggest that the effects of most of the legal variables are greater for the unrated firms 
than for rated firms.  For example, creditor rights are not related to ownership concentration 
(column 2, Table 7) or maturity (column 4, Tables 8 and 9) for the rated borrowers.  Similarly, 
legal formalism is strongly related to loan maturity (column 3, Tables 8 and 9) only for the unrated 
borrowers.
29  This makes sense because large and rated companies may have greater freedom than 
unrated companies to move their financial business around the world and thus find favorable 
contracting environments.  In contrast, government risk appears to affect loan ownership (Table 7) 
to both rated and unrated firms. 
  We also find two interesting difference across these sets of borrowers, both related to legal 
formalism.  First, formalism is positively related to the domestic ownership share to unrated firms 
but negatively related to the domestic share for rated borrowers (columns 5 and 6, Table 7).  Thus, 
foreign lenders seem to avoid lending to unrated and presumably relatively opaque firms in 
countries where legal formalism is high.  Our interpretation of this result is that domestic lenders 
have an especially big comparative advantage for unrated borrowers where legal formalism is 
high.  The reason is that local banks have the ability to restructure loans without access to the legal 
system, whereas foreign lenders do not have this ability (Mian, 2004).  The fact that foreign 
lenders hold a greater share of loans to rated borrowers where legal formalism is high indicates 
some substitution away from domestic banks for larger and rated firms in countries where the 
domestic banking system specializes in lending to unrated firms.  Second, the interest rate on loans 
                                                            
28 We do not have enough observations on collateral to estimate the probit model for the rated firms alone.  Results for 
unrated loans are not sensitive to dropping firm control variables used in Tables 4 through 6. 
 
29 However, separating the sample into secured and unsecured lending does not change the positive link from legal 
formalism to maturity.   27 
to rated borrowers increases with legal formalism, but interest rates are unrelated to formalism for 
unrated borrowers (columns 5 and 6, Tables 8 and 9).  In contrast to unrated borrowers (served by 
local banks), rated borrowers bear the cost of the legal system because their foreign lenders have 
to rely on the courts to collect on bad loans. 
IV. Conclusions 
  In this paper we examine how legal origin, creditor and property rights, the quality of the 
courts, and economic and financial development affect the design of bank loan contracts across a 
wide cross section of countries.  Our results support the law and finance view that private 
contracts reflect differences in legal protection of creditors and properties, as well as the cost of 
writing and enforcing contracts.  In particular, we find that secured lending is less common in 
countries with undeveloped financial markets and weak protection of creditor rights.  At the same 
time, weak protection of creditor rights, in particular creditors’ rights to seize collateral, comes 
with greater diffusion of loan ownership, shorter term lending, and higher interest rates.  Thus, we 
can begin to paint a clearer picture of why creditor rights are important in generating good 
financial outcomes.  With them, lenders can control borrowers with collateral because they know 
they will be able to take assets, or credibly threaten to take assets, ex post in default.  Collateral is 
probably even more useful where economic and financial development allows assets to be 
liquidated, as we find more secured lending in countries with higher income per capita.  In 
contrast, lenders resort to diffuse ownership, short maturity, and higher interest rates to control 
borrowers in countries where creditor rights are weak. 
  Our results also suggest that contracting costs, as measured by legal formalism, shape the 
terms of bank loans.  Where legal formalism is high, domestic banks are the main lender to 
unrated firms.  In these environments, loan maturity tends to be longer (to reduce contracting   28 
costs) while the use of collateral tends to be more common (to reduce risk).  We do not find, 
however, that interest rates reflect legal formalism for unrated borrowers.  For rated borrowers, 
legal formalism is associated with a greater role of foreign banks.  For these borrowers, interest 
rates do increase significantly with legal formalism.  This pricing relationship, we argue, reflects 
foreign banks’ greater reliance on the legal system to collect on defaulted loans.   
As a final caveat, we only explore empirically the terms of loans actually made; borrower 
access to credit may be limited where property rights and corruption are most problematic.  
Studying credit access may require more detailed firm-level data than is currently available across 
a wide range of countries.  29 
Appendix:  Brief Descriptions of All the Variables and Their Sources 
 
A.1. Legal Variables  
 
Variables Description  Sources 
Legal Origin  Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of 
each country  
Reynolds and Flores 




Equals 1 if the reorganization procedure imposes restrictions, such as 




No automatic stay 
on secured assets 
Equals 1 if the reorganization procedure does not impose an 
automatic stay on the assets of the firm on filing the reorganization 
petition. Automatic stay prevents secured creditors from gaining 
possession of their security. It equals zero if such a restriction does 






Equals 1 if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the 
proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt 
firm. Equals zero if nonsecured creditors, such as the government and 






Equals 1 when an official appointed by the court, or by the creditors, 
is responsible for the operation of the business during reorganization. 
Equivalently, this variable equals one if the debtor does not keep the 
administration of its property pending the resolution of the 






An index aggregating different creditor rights. The index is formed by 
adding “1” when:  (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as 
creditors' consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) 
secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the 
reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) 
secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds 
that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and 
(4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property 
pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from 
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A.2. Institutional Variables  
 
Variables 




The Index measures substantive and procedural statutory 
intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts, 
and is formed by adding up these indices: 1) professionals 
vs. laymen; 2) written vs. oral elements; 3) legal 
justification; 4) statutory regulation of evidence; 5) control 
of superior review; 6) engagement formalities; 7) 
independent procedural actions. 
Survey of Lex Mundi/Lex 
Africa association of law 
firms; DLLS (2003), and 
details available at 
http://iicg.som.yale.edu/   
Property Rights 
Index 
Variables includes freedom from government influence 
over the judicial system, commercial code defining 
contracts, sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract 
disputes, government expropriation of property, corruption 
within the judiciary, delays in receiving judicial decisions, 
and legally granted and protected private property.  
2000 Index of Economic 
Freedom (Heritage 
Foundation) 
Corruption  ICR's assessment of the corruption in government. Lower 
scores indicate that "high government officials are likely to 
demand special payments" and "illegal payments are 
generally expected throughout lower levels of government" 
in the form of "bribes connected with import and export 
licenses, tax assessment, policy protection, etc." Average of 
the months of April and October of the monthly index 
between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower 
scores for higher levels of corruption (we changed the scale 
from its original" range going from zero to six) 
International Country Risk 
Guide; LLSV (1998) 
     
 
A.3. Miscellaneous Country-level Variables 
 
Variable Description  Sources 
Economic 
Development  
Average of Log (per capita GDP) over the period 1994-2002; 





Claims on private sector by banks as share of  
GDP, averaged over the 1994 to 1997 period 
 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2000) 
Percentage 
change in GDP 
Percent change in GDP in two adjacent years, measuring 
business cycle of a country 
World Bank  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Loan-Level Variables 
Summary statistics on the loan terms by the legal origin of the borrower country are presented here. The 
source of data is LPC’s Dealscan database. The sample of loans including those originated in 1994 through 
the middle of 2003.  Loans from to firms in financial or regulated industries, as well a public sector loans, 
are dropped. 
 





English Legal Origin      (1) (2) (3) 
Number of Lenders  5.1  6.6  8,957 
Percent held by Government Banks     5.2  16.2  8,957 
Percent held by Domestic Banks    29.3  36.9  8,957 
One if Secured     0.33  -  4,123 
Maturity (Months)     61  41  7,652 
Drawn All-in Spread (BPS over LIBOR)     164  113  2,018 
Loan Size (MM$s)    176  444  8,957 
          
French Legal Origin         
Number of Lenders  7.4  8.4  5,427 
Percent held by Government Banks     5.9  17.2  5,427 
Percent held by Domestic Banks    30.6  36.4  5,427 
One if Secured     0.59  -  1,538 
Maturity (Months)     66  42  4,542 
Drawn All-in Spread (BPS over LIBOR)     180  120  2,655 
Loan Size (MM$s)    160  376  5,427 
          
German Legal Origin         
Number of Lenders  6.0  6.9  5,526 
Percent held by Government Banks     6.7  15.7  5,526 
Percent held by Domestic Banks    70.7  38.9  5,526 
One if Secured     0.27  -  2,062 
Maturity (Months)     50  35  5,242 
Drawn All-in Spread (BPS over LIBOR)      170 114 657 
Loan Size (MM$s)    159  468  5,526 
          
Scandinavian Legal Origin       
Number of Lenders  6.9  7.3  372 
Percent held by Government Banks     12.5  19.8  372 
Percent held by Domestic Banks    20.2  29.0  372 
One if Secured     0.75  -  36 
Maturity (Months)     72  48  274 
Drawn All-in Spread (BPS over LIBOR)      164 135 215 
Loan Size (MM$s)    224  456  372 
          
Socialist Legal Origin         
Number of Lenders  5.3  5.3  1,086 
Percent held by Government Banks     21.5  32.4  1,086 
Percent held by Domestic Banks    9.6  23.1  1,086 
One if Secured     0.49  -  472 
Maturity (Months)     62  43  873 
Drawn All-in Spread (BPS over LIBOR)      230 147 268 
Loan Size (MM$s)    133  491  1,086   35 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics for Country-Level Variables 
 
Summary statistics for (borrower) country-level variables across five legal-origin groupings are presented 
here. The mean for each variable is obtained by taking the simple average of the scores/index of the group 
countries. Detailed descriptions and sources for the variables are presented in Appendix A.1. 
 





English Legal Origin     (1)  (2)  (3) 
Property Rights (1 to 5, 5 means best protection of property)  3.92  0.94  36 
Check-Based Index of Legal Formalism (1 to 7, 7 means most formal)  2.75  0.85  34 
Creditor Rights (0 to 4, 4 means greatest level of creditor protection)  2.46  1.04  28 
Corruption (1 to 10, 10 means least corrupt)  5.70  2.53  33 
          
French Legal Origin          
Property Rights (1 to 5, 5 means best protection of property)  3.24  0.95  49 
Check-Based Index of Legal Formalism (1 to 7, 7 means most formal)  4.29  1.01  40 
Creditor Rights (0 to 4, 4 means greatest level of creditor protection)  1.43  1.05  46 
Corruption (1 to 10, 10 means least corrupt)  5.24  1.84  51 
          
German Legal Origin          
Property Rights (1 to 5, 5 means best protection of property)  5.00  0.00  5 
Check-Based Index of Legal Formalism (1 to 7, 7 means most formal)  3.15  0.44  6 
Creditor Rights (0 to 4, 4 means greatest level of creditor protection)  2.00  1.00  5 
Corruption (1 to 10, 10 means least corrupt)  8.03  1.68  6 
          
Scandinavian Legal Origin        
Property Rights (1 to 5, 5 means best protection of property)  4.80  0.45  5 
Check-Based Index of Legal Formalism (1 to 7, 7 means most formal)  3.15  0.59  5 
Creditor Rights (0 to 4, 4 means greatest level of creditor protection)  1.75  0.96  4 
Corruption (1 to 10, 10 means least corrupt)  10.00  0.00  5 
          
Socialist Legal Origin          
Property Rights (1 to 5, 5 means best protection of property)  2.76  0.94  21 
Check-Based Index of Legal Formalism (1 to 7, 7 means most formal)  3.98  0.49  15 
Creditor Rights (0 to 4, 4 means greatest level of creditor protection)  2.13  0.97  23 
Corruption (1 to 10, 10 mean least corrupt)  6.23  1.13  9 
   36 
Table 3 
Correlation Matrix of Firm Characteristics and Legal and Institutional Variables 
 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficient between three firm characteristics from Worldscope with four 
legal and institutional variables which are the focus of our regressions.  The sample of firms all appear on both 
Dealscan and Worldscope, and was selected in a stratified random sample (by country, with a maximum of 20 firms 
per country) subject to this data constraint.  The table contains the correlation, the p-value in parentheses, and the 
number of observations in square brackets. 
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Table 4  
Regressions Relating Loan Ownership to Country Characteristics 
 
Regressions contain year, ratings, 1-digit SIC industry, and loan purpose indicators.  Loan observations are 
clustered by borrower country. We also include an indicator for loans denominated in a major currency, 
and an indicator for multinational companies. The source of data is LPC’s Dealscan database. The sample 
of loans includes those originated in 1994 through the middle of 2003. Loans to firms in financial or 
regulated industries, as well a public sector loans, are dropped (SIC 4, 6, and 9). Regressions without firm 
controls exclude ratings, industry, multinational indicators and log of loan commitment amount. 
 
  Log of      Share Held by    Share held by 
Explanatory Variable  Number of Lenders    Government Banks    Domestic Banks 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4)    (5)  (6) 
One if loan is a line of credit  0.219  0.273    -0.949  -0.942    3.353  2.282 
 (3.76)**  (6.08)**    (1.87)*  (1.73)*    (2.76)**  (1.46) 
Log of loan commitment amount  0.170  -    -0.329  -    -3.685  - 
  (5.28)**  -   (1.33)  -   (6.06)** - 
One if French legal origin  0.220  0.258    1.234  1.465    -12.936  -13.979 
 (2.03)*  (2.48)*    (0.64)  (0.74)    (1.70)*  (1.66)* 
One if German legal origin  0.252  0.279    2.894  3.204    13.513  11.493 
 (1.96)*  (1.92)*    (1.06)  (1.13)    (2.16)*  (1.74)* 
One if Scandinavian legal origin  -0.166  -0.035    12.043  12.248    -10.906  -18.792 
 (1.09)  (0.21)    (4.67)**  (4.64)**    (1.11)  (1.81)* 
One if Socialist legal origin  0.054  -0.027    13.869  14.056    -26.847  -26.816 
 (0.31)  (0.15)    (3.22)**  (3.16)**    (3.46)**  (3.26)** 
Economic  Development  -0.150 -0.146    -2.951 -2.942    3.179 2.277 
  (2.49)* (2.16)*   (2.55)* (2.37)*   (0.67) (0.44) 
Financial Development   0.001  -0.067    -1.084  -0.952    17.703  20.108 
  (0.01) (0.80)      (0.47) (0.39)      (3.10)**  (3.27)** 
Percentage change in GDP  0.002  0.003    -0.016  -0.016    -0.098  -0.142 
  (0.75) (1.49)    (0.31) (0.31)    (0.82)  (1.03) 
Creditors' rights  -0.064  -0.067    0.342  0.425    -2.614  -2.350 
  (1.62) (1.58)    (0.45) (0.52)    (0.97)  (0.77) 
Legal formalism  0.030  0.021    -0.034  -0.033    9.272  10.045 
  (0.52) (0.31)    (0.04) (0.04)    (2.97)**  (3.07)** 
Property rights   0.081  0.099    3.266  3.135    -8.640  -8.940 
 (0.94)  (1.07)    (1.90)*  (1.73)*    (1.88)*  (1.74)* 
Corruption (higher means less corrupt)  0.066  0.087    -0.414  -0.449    1.491  1.585 
 (1.77)*  (2.28)*    (0.65)  (0.68)    (0.55)  (0.55) 
Observations  11,083 11,083    11,083 11,083    11,083  11,083 
Number  of  Countries  57 57    57 57    57  57 
Firm  Controls  Included?  Yes No    Yes No    Yes  No 
R-squared  0.21 0.15    0.09 0.09    0.29  0.26 
Estimation  Technique  OLS OLS    OLS OLS    OLS  OLS 
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Table 5   
Regressions Relating Loan Contract Terms to Country Characteristics 
 
Regressions contain year, ratings, 1-digit SIC industry, and loan purpose indicators.  Loan observations are 
clustered by borrower country. We also include an indicator for loans denominated in a major currency, 
and an indicator for multinational companies. The source of data is LPC’s Dealscan database. The sample 
of loans includes those originated in 1994 through the middle of 2003. Loans to firms in financial or 
regulated industries, as well a public sector loans, are dropped (SIC 4, 6, and 9). Regressions without firm 
controls exclude ratings, industry, multinational indicators and log of loan commitment amount. 
 
Panel A: Single Creditor Rights Index (ranging from 0 to 4) 
 
       Log of Maturity in    Log of Drawn All-in 
Explanatory Variable  Secured Indicator     Months        Spread 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
One if loan is a line of credit  -0.013  -0.023    -0.544  -0.549    -0.302  -0.378 
 (0.42)  (0.66)    (4.09)**  (4.07)**    (6.00)**  (5.87)** 
Log of loan commitment amount  -0.037  -    0.005  -    -0.154  - 
 (2.87)**  -    (0.25)  -    (8.15)**  - 
One if French legal origin  0.102  0.096    -0.012  -0.025    -0.080  -0.080 
 (1.21)  (1.06)    (0.14)  (0.28)    (0.56)  (0.51) 
One if German legal origin  -0.308  -0.314    -0.198  -0.203    0.012  -0.057 
 (3.59)**  (3.29)**    (1.69)*  (1.77)*    (0.10)  (0.45) 
One if Scandinavian legal origin  0.347  0.375    -0.176  -0.200    -0.108  -0.200 
 (2.24)*  (2.63)**    (1.71)*  (1.80)*    (0.64)  (1.14) 
One if Socialist legal origin  -0.230  -0.221    -0.196  -0.205    -0.376  -0.355 
 (3.85)**  (3.58)**    (1.52)  (1.59)    (1.42)  (1.18) 
Economic Development  0.085  0.090    -0.061  -0.059    -0.221  -0.203 
 (1.77)*  (1.89)*    (1.33)  (1.28)    (1.48)  (1.13) 
Financial Development   0.172  0.168    -0.120  -0.125    0.027  -0.007 
  (1.90)*  (1.76)*     (1.45)  (1.62)     (0.17)  (0.05) 
Percentage change in GDP  0.000  0.001    0.002  0.002    0.004  0.004 
 (0.25)  (0.52)    (1.29)  (1.28)    (0.97)  (1.05) 
Creditors' rights  0.081  0.077    0.095  0.092    -0.018  0.007 
 (2.67)**  (2.40)*    (3.04)**  (3.04)**    (0.38)  (0.14) 
Legal formalism  0.076  0.077    0.133  0.136    -0.027  -0.016 
 (2.61)**  (2.48)*    (4.50)**  (4.64)**    (0.26)  (0.15) 
Property rights   -0.213  -0.210    0.032  0.034    0.005  -0.044 
 (4.69)**  (4.70)**    (0.68)  (0.72)    (0.04)  (0.31) 
Corruption (higher means less corrupt)  -0.023  -0.026    0.093  0.095    -0.045  -0.044 
 (0.76)  (0.83)    (3.16)**  (3.42)**    (0.48)  (0.41) 
Observations 4,474  4,474    9,578  9,578    3,608  3,608 
Number of Countries  46  46    57  57    42  42 
Firm Controls Included?  Yes  No    Yes  No    Yes  No 
R-squared (pseudo for probits)  0.23  0.2    0.33  0.32    0.52  0.43 
Estimation Technique  Probit  Probit    OLS  OLS    OLS  OLS 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Regressions Relating Loan Contract Terms to Country Characteristics 
 
Panel B: Two Creditor Rights Indices (each ranging from 0 to 2) 
            
       Log of Maturity in    Log of Drawn All-in 
Explanatory Variable  Secured Indicator     Months        Spread 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
One if loan is a line of credit  -0.004  -0.015    -0.526  -0.532    -0.291  -0.367 
 (0.14)  (0.46)    (3.88)**  (3.84)**    (5.36)**  (5.32)** 
Log of loan commitment amount  -0.038  -    0.001  -    -0.153  - 
 (2.86)**  -    (0.05)  -    (7.93)**  - 
One if French legal origin  0.289  0.273    0.003  -0.018    -0.352  -0.357 
 (2.88)**  (2.62)**    (0.04)  (0.20)    (2.61)*  (2.48)* 
One if German legal origin  -0.232  -0.239    -0.206  -0.216    -0.091  -0.156 
  (2.78)**  (2.64)**   (1.89)* (2.02)*    (0.90)  (1.48) 
One if Scandinavian legal origin  0.338  0.355    -0.246  -0.285    -0.295  -0.393 
  (2.25)*  (2.62)**   (2.44)* (2.52)*   (1.78)*  (2.68)* 
Economic  Development  0.038  0.046  -0.088 -0.086   -0.402  -0.421 
  (0.83)  (1.00)  (1.74)* (1.70)*   (2.98)**  (2.95)** 
Financial Development   0.042  0.035    -0.144  -0.141    -0.027  -0.058 
  (0.53)  (0.41)     (1.71)*  (1.75)*     (0.15)  (0.35) 
Percentage change in GDP  0.001  0.001    0.003  0.003    0.003  0.004 
 (0.28)  (0.53)    (1.61)  (1.60)    (0.84)  (1.08) 
Creditors' rights: ability to oust management  0.037  0.042  -0.018 -0.022   -0.026  0.016 
 (0.97)  (0.99)    (0.42)  (0.49)    (0.28)  (0.19) 
Creditors' rights: ability to take collateral  0.126  0.123    0.128  0.125    -0.191  -0.188 
  (2.55)* (2.27)*  (2.69)* (2.68)*   (2.09)*  (2.02)* 
Legal formalism  0.034  0.040    0.092  0.097    0.076  0.109 
  (1.44)  (1.72)  (2.32)* (2.38)*    (0.72)  (1.10) 
Property rights   -0.080  -0.078    0.086  0.081    0.161  0.133 
 (1.37)  (1.27)    (1.59)  (1.49)    (1.05)  (0.80) 
Corruption (higher means less corrupt)  0.008  0.004    0.106  0.106    0.008  0.023 
 (0.27)  (0.14)    (3.79)**  (4.06)**    (0.09)  (0.29) 
Observations 4,286  4,286    9,222  9,222    3,494  3,494 
Number of Countries  38  38    42  42    30  30 
Firm Controls Included?  Yes  No    Yes  No    Yes  No 
R-squared (pseudo for probits)  0.24  0.22    0.33  0.32    0.54  0.46 
Estimation Technique  Probit  Probit    OLS  OLS    OLS  OLS 
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Table 6 
Regressions Relating Loan Contract Terms to Country Characteristics 
With Loan Ownership Variables Included as Regressors 
 
Regressions contain year, ratings, 1-digit SIC industry, and loan purpose indicators.  Loan observations are clustered by borrower 
country. We also include an indicator for loans denominated in a major currency, and an indicator for multinational companies. The 
source of data is LPC’s Dealscan database. The sample of loans includes those originated in 1994 through the middle of 2003. 
Loans to firms in financial or regulated industries, as well a public sector loans, are dropped (SIC 4, 6, and 9). Regressions without 
firm controls exclude ratings, industry, multinational indicators and log of loan commitment amount. 
 
       Log of Maturity in    Log of Drawn All-in 
Explanatory Variable  Secured Indicator     Months        Spread 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
One if loan is a line of credit  -0.041  -0.046    -0.546  -0.551    -0.303  -0.367 
 (1.71)  (1.62)    (4.08)**  (4.07)**    (6.09)**  (6.12)** 
Log of loan commitment amount  -0.047  -    0.005  -    -0.162  - 
 (3.13)**  -    (0.24)  -    (8.15)**  - 
Log of Number of Lenders  0.066  0.053    0.012  0.012    -0.016  -0.101 
 (3.02)**  (2.99)**    (1.00)  (1.03)    (1.41)  (6.69)** 
Share held by Government Banks  0.000  0.000    0.002  0.002    -0.003  -0.002 
 (0.62)  (0.48)    (1.80)*  (1.69)*    (1.42)  (0.93) 
Share held by Domestic Banks  0.000  0.000    0.001  0.001    -0.003  -0.002 
 (0.17)  (0.67)    (1.58)  (1.63)    (4.53)**  (2.66)* 
One if French legal origin  0.091  0.090    -0.010  -0.022    -0.066  -0.066 
 (1.08)  (1.00)    (0.11)  (0.25)    (0.52)  (0.46) 
One if German legal origin  -0.315  -0.321    -0.215  -0.219    0.077  0.015 
 (3.70)**  (3.38)**    (1.93)*  (2.01)*    (0.75)  (0.13) 
One if Scandinavian legal origin  0.369  0.394    -0.191  -0.210    -0.146  -0.243 
 (2.30)*  (2.69)**    (1.86)*  (1.90)*    (0.93)  (1.37) 
One if Socialist legal origin  -0.236  -0.221    -0.204  -0.210    -0.421  -0.396 
 (3.58)**  (3.18)**    (1.59)  (1.62)    (1.77)*  (1.39) 
Economic Development  0.091  0.093    -0.055  -0.053    -0.168  -0.180 
 (1.91)*  (1.85)*    (1.20)  (1.16)    (1.32)  (1.10) 
Financial Development   0.179  0.172    -0.127  -0.134    -0.038  -0.061 
  (1.87)*  (1.70)*     (1.60)  (1.78)*     (0.27)  (0.39) 
Percentage change in GDP  0.000  0.001    0.002  0.002    0.003  0.004 
 (0.12)  (0.41)    (1.33)  (1.33)    (0.94)  (1.14) 
Creditors' rights  0.090  0.085    0.097  0.094    -0.009  0.003 
 (3.02)**  (2.70)**    (3.13)**  (3.12)**    (0.21)  (0.07) 
Legal formalism  0.074  0.072    0.128  0.130    -0.023  -0.025 
 (2.46)*  (2.25)*    (4.28)**  (4.37)**    (0.24)  (0.24) 
Property rights   -0.223  -0.215    0.028  0.031    -0.026  -0.053 
 (4.88)**  (4.62)**    (0.63)  (0.67)    (0.22)  (0.39) 
Corruption (higher means less corrupt)  -0.025  -0.028    0.092  0.093    -0.031  -0.030 
 (0.80)  (0.91)    (3.24)**  (3.47)**    (0.39)  (0.31) 
Observations 4,474  4,474    9,578  9,578    3,608  3,608 
Number of Countries  46  46    57  57    42  42 
Firm Controls Included?  Yes  No    Yes  No    Yes  No 
R-squared (pseudo for probits)  0.24  0.21    0.33  0.32    0.53  0.45 
Estimation Technique  Probit  Probit    OLS  OLS    OLS  OLS 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 1%   41 
 
Table 7 
Regressions Relating Loan Ownership to Country Characteristics 
Rated vs. Unrated Borrowers 
 
Regressions contain year, ratings, 1-digit SIC industry, and loan purpose indicators.  Loan observations are 
clustered by borrower country. We also include an indicator for loans denominated in a major currency, 
and an indicator for multinational companies. The source of data is LPC’s Dealscan database. The sample 
of loans includes those originated in 1994 through the middle of 2003.  Loans to firms in financial or 
regulated industries, as well a public sector loans, are dropped (SIC 4, 6, and 9). Regressions without firm 
controls exclude ratings, industry, multinational indicators and log of loan commitment amount. 
 
  Log of      Share Held by    Share held by 
Explanatory Variable  Number of Lenders     Government Banks     Domestic Banks 
  (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)   (5)  (6) 
One if loan is a line of credit  0.207  0.180    -1.009  -0.297    3.488  -3.518 
  (3.34)**  (4.41)**  (2.02)*  (0.23)   (2.49)* (2.00)* 
Log of loan commitment amount  0.155  0.337    -0.308  -0.882    -3.656  -1.917 
 (5.10)**  (14.48)**    (1.19)  (2.33)*    (5.61)**  (2.57)* 
One if French legal origin  0.227  0.032    1.341  -1.460    -13.489  9.837 
 (2.15)*  (0.11)    (0.68)  (0.44)    (1.74)*  (1.55) 
One if German legal origin  0.212  0.377    2.538  4.197    14.384  16.729 
 (1.74)*  (1.93)*    (0.87)  (1.74)*    (2.15)*  (4.59)** 
One if Scandinavian legal origin  -0.204  -0.277    13.164  6.030    -10.139  -8.585 
 (1.31)  (0.83)    (4.99)**  (1.08)    (1.00)  (1.09) 
One if Socialist legal origin  0.063  -1.003    14.079  10.720    -28.084  -2.550 
  (0.35)  (1.91)   (3.18)**  (1.48)   (3.65)**  (0.22) 
Economic Development  -0.138  -0.363    -2.911  -2.189    3.314  13.946 
 (2.30)*  (1.54)    (2.42)*  (0.90)    (0.69)  (2.41)* 
Financial Development   0.022  -0.297    -0.869  -2.140    18.213  -12.540 
  (0.26)  (1.64)     (0.37)  (0.80)     (3.25)**  (1.61) 
Percentage change in GDP  0.001  0.017    -0.022  0.129    -0.067  -0.275 
  (0.48)  (2.65)*  (0.41)  (1.37)   (0.55)  (1.35) 
Creditors' rights  -0.073  0.006    0.395  -0.001    -2.891  3.688 
  (1.82)*  (0.07)   (0.50)  (0.01)   (1.10) (2.12)* 
Legal formalism  0.037  0.145    -0.009  0.569    9.614  -7.286 
 (0.61)  (0.80)    (0.01)  (0.35)    (3.26)**  (2.75)** 
Property rights   0.082  -0.008    3.329  1.881    -9.263  -6.769 
  (0.91)  (0.05)   (1.88)*  (0.78)   (1.98)* (2.49)* 
Corruption (higher means less corrupt)  0.063  0.264    -0.486  0.465    1.464  -0.451 
  (1.75)*  (2.34)*  (0.71)  (0.21)   (0.54)  (0.13) 
Observations  10,324  759   10,324  759   10,324  759 
Number  of  Countries  57  32   57  32   57  32 
Rated?  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R-squared 0.16  0.43    0.09  0.16    0.3  0.29 
Estimation Technique  OLS  OLS    OLS  OLS    OLS  OLS 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 8 
Regressions Relating Loan Contract Terms to Country Characteristics 
Rated vs. Unrated Borrowers 
 
Regressions contain year, ratings, 1-digit SIC industry, and loan purpose indicators.  Loan observations are 
clustered by borrower country. We also include an indicator for loans denominated in a major currency, 
and an indicator for multinational companies. The source of data is LPC’s Dealscan database. The sample 
of loans includes those originated in 1994 through the middle of 2003.  Loans to firms in financial or 
regulated industries, as well a public sector loans, are dropped (SIC 4, 6, and 9). Regressions without firm 
controls exclude ratings, industry, multinational indicators and log of loan commitment amount. 
 
       Log of Maturity in    Log of Drawn All- 
Explanatory Variable  Secured Indicator     Months        In Spread 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
One if loan is a line of credit  -0.017  -    -0.550  -0.367    -0.285  -0.364 
 (0.51)  -    (3.98)**  (2.34)*    (6.01)**  (3.58)** 
Log of loan commitment amount  -0.035  -    0.010  -0.083    -0.155  -0.139 
 (2.77)**  -    (0.51)  (2.31)*    (7.23)**  (7.06)** 
One if French legal origin  0.097  -    0.001  -0.251    -0.047  -0.347 
  (1.05)  -  (0.01)  (1.42)  (0.30) (1.84)* 
One if German legal origin  -0.309  -    -0.206  -0.138    0.080  -0.521 
 (3.44)**  -    (1.63)  (0.89)    (0.67)  (3.53)** 
One if Scandinavian legal origin  0.302  -    -0.096  -0.472    -0.127  -0.215 
 (1.89)*  -    (0.84)  (2.55)*    (0.71)  (0.93) 
One if Socialist legal origin  -0.227  -    -0.184  -0.392    -0.375  0.041 
 (3.98)**  -    (1.41)  (1.30)    (1.33)  (0.11) 
Economic Development  0.093  -    -0.056  -0.207    -0.222  -0.112 
  (1.82)* -    (1.18) (1.34)    (1.37)  (0.60) 
Financial Development   0.164  -    -0.115  0.045    0.028  0.138 
  (1.73)* -      (1.33) (0.34)      (0.15)  (0.87) 
Percentage change in GDP  0.001  -    0.002  0.005    0.005  -0.003 
 (0.64)  -    (1.10)  (0.77)    (1.11)  (0.49) 
Creditors' rights  0.063  -    0.098  -0.012    -0.020  -0.019 
 (1.92)*  -    (2.84)**  (0.24)    (0.35)  (0.48) 
Legal formalism  0.066  -    0.135  -0.025    -0.045  0.283 
  (2.25)*  -   (4.35)** (0.24)  (0.42) (2.23)* 
Property rights   -0.210  -    0.027  0.151    0.017  -0.051 
 (4.20)**  -    (0.55)  (1.65)*    (0.12)  (0.49) 
Corruption (higher means less corrupt)  -0.028  -    0.091  -0.006    -0.058  0.024 
 (0.87)  -    (2.97)**  (0.09)    (0.54)  (0.22) 
Observations 4,343      8,883  695    3,046  562 
Number of Countries  46      57  32    42 23 
Rated? No      No  Yes    No  Yes 
R-squared (pseudo for probits)  0.23      0.32  0.47    0.46  0.75 
Estimation  Technique  Probit    OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 9 
Regressions Relating Loan Contract Terms to Country Characteristics 
(With Loan Ownership Variables Included as Regressors): Rated vs. Unrated Borrowers 
 
Regressions contain year, ratings, 1-digit SIC industry, and loan purpose indicators.  Loan observations are clustered by borrower 
country. We also include an indicator for loans denominated in a major currency, and an indicator for multinational companies. The 
source of data is LPC’s Dealscan database. The sample of loans includes those originated in 1994 through the middle of 2003.  
Loans to firms in financial or regulated industries, as well a public sector loans, are dropped (SIC 4, 6, and 9). Regressions without 
firm controls exclude ratings, industry, multinational indicators and log of loan commitment amount. 
 
       Log of maturity in    Log of Drawn All-in 
Explanatory Variable  Secured Indicator     Months        Spread 
  (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)   (5)  (6) 
One if loan is a line of credit  -0.044  -    -0.554  -0.356    -0.284  -0.378 
  (1.77)*  -   (4.00)** (2.32)*   (5.98)**  (3.69)** 
Log of loan commitment amount  -0.045  -    0.010  -0.071    -0.163  -0.144 
 (3.06)**  -    (0.45)  (1.90)*    (7.30)**  (6.86)** 
Log of Number of Lenders  0.067  -    0.018  -0.049    -0.015  -0.017 
 (3.07)**  -    (1.68)*  (1.10)    (1.23)  (0.55) 
Share held by Government Banks  0.000  -    0.002  -0.002    -0.003  -0.006 
 (0.63)  -    (1.85)*  (0.35)    (1.33)  (1.56) 
Share held by Domestic Banks  0.000  -    0.001  -0.001    -0.004  -0.003 
 (0.10)  -    (1.73)*  (0.80)    (4.39)**  (2.74)* 
One if French legal origin  0.084  -    0.003  -0.235    -0.038  -0.349 
  (0.92)  -  (0.03)  (1.38)   (0.27)  (2.05)* 
One if German legal origin  -0.316  -    -0.224  -0.096    0.150  -0.453 
 (3.52)**  -    (1.88)*  (0.62)    (1.41)  (3.10)** 
One if Scandinavian legal origin  0.328  -    -0.111  -0.476    -0.160  -0.270 
  (2.05)*  -  (0.98) (2.54)*   (0.93)  (1.21) 
One if Socialist legal origin  -0.236  -    -0.191  -0.409    -0.415  -0.031 
  (3.82)**  -  (1.47)  (1.38)   (1.64)  (0.09) 
Economic  Development  0.100  -  -0.049 -0.203   -0.167  -0.116 
  (1.98)*  -  (1.05)  (1.41)   (1.22)  (0.66) 
Financial Development   0.175  -    -0.123  0.015    -0.025  0.048 
  (1.77)*  -     (1.50)  (0.13)     (0.14)  (0.30) 
Percentage change in GDP  0.001  -    0.002  0.005    0.004  -0.003 
  (0.53)  -  (1.15)  (0.87)   (1.11)  (0.54) 
Creditors' rights  0.072  -    0.102  -0.007    -0.014  -0.006 
 (2.26)*  -    (2.98)**  (0.14)    (0.27)  (0.16) 
Legal formalism  0.065  -    0.128  -0.029    -0.040  0.289 
 (2.20)*  -    (4.14)**  (0.29)    (0.41)  (2.46)* 
Property rights   -0.224  -    0.023  0.146    -0.013  -0.091 
  (4.55)**  -  (0.49)  (1.58)   (0.10)  (1.03) 
Corruption (higher means less corrupt)   -0.029  -    0.090  0.001    -0.047  0.064 
 (0.90)  -    (3.05)**  (0.06)    (0.51)  (0.66) 
Observations  4,343    8,883  695   3,046  562 
Number of Countries  46      57  32    42 23 
Rated?  No     No  Yes   No  Yes 
R-squared (pseudo for probits)  0.24      0.33  0.47    0.47  0.75 
Estimation  Technique  Probit    OLS  OLS   OLS  OLS 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 1% 